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Martin: TRUMP V. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Program
137 S.Ct. 2080 (2017)1
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is undeniable that our country has undergone a unique change
throughout the last several years. While the people have been the ultimate
catalyst, the United States government, and especially our newly elected
president, have accelerated and inflamed that change, resulting in an
increased partisan divide. The Supreme Court of the United States was
forced into this political divide when it was asked to determine whether the
Executive should be afforded a stay of injunctions on an executive order
that could drastically alter the country’s immigration policies for the
foreseeable future.
The question before the Court in Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance
Program2, (“IRAP”), was whether the Court should stay two separate
injunctions prohibiting the enforcement of President Donald J. Trump’s
Executive Order ordering the suspension of entry of nationals from six
countries.3 The Court granted the stay of injunctions insofar as the
injunctions prevented enforcement of the Executive Order with respect to
foreign nationals who have no bona fide relationship with a person or entity
of the United States, leaving the injunctions in place for the respondents and
those similarly situated.4 In its judgment, however, the Court arguably
failed to effectively follow the fundamental legal principles for issuing a
stay of a preliminary injunction. Notably, the Court failed to address
whether the Executive (the “Government”) was likely to succeed on the
merits. The Court also improperly balanced the equities. Accordingly, the
Court should have stayed the injunctions in their entirety if the legal
standard been properly applied. Instead, the Court’s decision to tailor its
equitable judgment by creating classes of immigrants that had not existed
before may have significant consequences for the lower courts and the
nation.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following an immediate challenge, a nationwide temporary restraining
order, and the eventual revocation of his first executive order directing the
1. This note was written prior to the Supreme Court’s decision to dismiss as moot the merits of
this case. See Miscellaneous Order, 583 U.S. ____ (2017).
2. 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) [hereinafter IRAP].
3. Id. at 2087.
4. Id.
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temporary suspension of entry of certain foreign nationals into the U.S.,
President Trump issued Executive Order No. 13780, hereinafter referred to
as EO-2, on March 16, 2017.5 In relevant part, EO-2 set out a series of
directives that were ultimately challenged in two separate courts. First, EO2 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a global review of
the adequacy of information foreign governments provide about nationals
applying for United States visas.6 Second, EO-2 directed the suspension of
entry of foreign nationals from six countries identified as presenting
heightened terrorism risks for ninety days to prevent entry of potentially
dangerous individuals during the Secretary of Homeland Security’s review
process.7 The temporary halt on entry would also reduce the investigative
burden on agencies, facilitate proper review, and establish adequate
standards to prevent the “infiltration by foreign terrorists.”8 Third, EO-2
suspended the acceptance of refugees under the United States Refugee
Assistance Program (“USRAP”) for 120 days following the effective date.9
Fourth, EO-2 limited the entry of refugees into the United States in the 2017
fiscal year to no more than 50,000, reasoning any number greater than this
would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.”10 The Order’s
effective date was March 16, 2017.11
Two separate lawsuits were filed in opposition to EO-2, claiming that
the Order violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
because it was motivated by an “animus toward Islam” and not by national
security concerns.12 The lawsuits also claimed that EO-2 did not comply
with the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).13 The first lawsuit was
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland by the
International Refugee Assistance Program on behalf of three organizations
and six individuals, including John Doe #1, a lawful permanent resident
whose Iranian wife was seeking entry to the United States.14 In that case,
the district court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction barring the
government from enforcing § 2(c) of EO-2, reasoning John Doe #1 was
5. Id. at 2083.
6. Exec. Order No. 13780 § 2(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13212 (March 9, 2017) [hereinafter EO2] (directing the Secretary to report his findings within 20 days of the Order’s effective date, followed by
a 50-day period where nations identified as deficient would be charged with correcting their practices).
7. EO-2 § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213.
8. Id.
9. EO-2 § 6(a), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13215-16 (instructing the Secretary of State to evaluate the
USRAP application process and implement any additional procedures to ensure potential refugees do not
pose a threat to national security).
10. EO-2 § 6(b), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13216.
11. EO-2 § 14, 82 Fed. Reg. at 13218.
12. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2084.
13. Id.
14. Int’l Refugee Assistance Program v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37645 at *16-19 (D.
Md., Mar. 16, 2017).
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likely to succeed on his Establishment Clause claim.15 In the second
lawsuit, U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii issued a nationwide
preliminary injunction of §§ 2 and 6 after the State of Hawaii and Dr. Ismail
Elshikh, a state resident who had a family member seeking entry, claimed
those sections violated the Establishment Clause.16 The Government
appealed both rulings.17
On May 25, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit issued a decision that upheld the lower court’s injunction prohibiting
the enforcement of § 2(c), holding the primary purpose of that section to be
religious.18 That court found that a reasonable observer familiar with all the
circumstances—including the predominantly Muslim character of the
designated countries and statements made by President Trump during his
presidential campaign—would conclude that § 2(c) was motivated
principally by a desire to exclude Muslims rather than for secular reasons.19
On June 12, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
unanimously held in favor of the plaintiffs, upholding the lower court’s
nationwide injunction concerning § 2(c) entry suspension and the § 6(a)-(b)
refugee admission program and limit.20 The Ninth Circuit, however, did not
base its holding on the lower court’s constitutional analysis, but held EO-2
likely exceeded the president’s authority under the INA.21
The Government petitioned for certiorari and filed applications seeking
stays of the injunctions.22 The Court granted the Government’s petitions for
certiorari and consolidated the cases to later be argued on its merits.23 The
Court then moved to address whether the preliminary injunctions barring
enforcement of the § 2(c) entry suspension should be stayed.24 The Court
ultimately dismissed the case as moot; the provision was temporary because
the suspending of foreign nationals from the specified countries “expired by
its own terms” on September 24, 2017.25

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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Id. at *59.
Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47042 at *2 (D. Haw., March 29, 2017).
Int’l Refugee Assistance Program v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 581 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 595.
Id. at 595.
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 755-56 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id.
IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
Id. at 2086.
Id. at 2087.
Miscellaneous Order, 583 U.S. ____ (2017).
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COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. Per Curiam Opinion

The Court delivered a per curiam decision while Justice Thomas filed
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Alito
and Gorsuch joined.26 The Court initially noted its equitable discretion and
flexibility when issuing a stay, which allowed the Court to weigh all the
circumstances surrounding the issue and tailor a unique stay.27 Balancing
the equities of the Government and the respondents, as well as the interests
of the public at large, the Court granted the Government’s stay application
in part and narrowed the scope of the injunctions as to § 2(c).28
The Court examined the balancing of the equities analysis performed by
the lower courts.29 Noting the hardships suffered by the delayed entry of the
respondents’ family members into the United States, the Court took issue
with the generalized weight given to foreign nationals.30 The Court
reasoned that denying entry to a foreign national with no connection to the
United States does not burden any American party or create any legally
relevant hardship as compared to the respondents.31 Therefore, the Court
narrowed the scope of the injunction on § 2(c), holding the injunctions
would remain in place only with respect to the respondents and those
similarly situated; essentially § 2(c) would not be enforced against any
foreign national who had a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a
person or entity in the United States.32 The Court then defined a “bona fide
relationship” as a close familial relationship for individuals or a formal,
documented relationship for entities “formed in the ordinary course, rather
than for the purpose of evading EO-2.”33 The Court also applied this
reasoning to the Hawaii injunction, which suspended § 6 of EO-2 as well.34
In that reasoning, the Court concluded that the scales tip in favor of the
Government’s compelling need to provide for the Nation’s security when it
comes to refugees who lack any bona fide connection to the United States.35

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2082, 2089.
Id. at 2087.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2088.
IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2088.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2089.
Id.
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B. Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part Opinion by Justice
Thomas
Justice Thomas, with whom Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined,
concurred with the Court’s per curiam opinion insofar as the preliminary
injunctions entered should have been stayed but disagreed with the extent of
the decision, stating that he would have stayed the injunctions in full.36
Justice Thomas took issue with the Court’s reasoning, remarking that a
court’s decision to grant a stay must be “guided by sound legal principles,”
the most critical factors being “‘(1) whether the stay applicant has made a
strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits and (2) whether
the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay.’”37 Only after those
factors are satisfied, Justice Thomas declared, can the Court balance the
equities by exploring relative harms and the public interest. 38
Justice Thomas analyzed the case according to these principles and held
that the Government satisfied the “likely-to-succeed” standard by showing a
significant reason for issuing a stay pending certiorari and making a strong
showing that it was likely to succeed on its merits.39 Following this
analysis, Justice Thomas balanced the equities of the parties and argued that
a failure to stay the injunctions would cause irreparable harm by interfering
with national security interests, tipping the scales in the Government’s
favor.40 Justice Thomas concluded his argument by acknowledging
potential issues the Court’s opinion might create, such as the broad scope of
the relief and the burden of extensive decision-making on executive
officials and courts.41 Accordingly, Justice Thomas, along with Justices
Alito and Gorsuch, advocated for the stay of the injunctions in their
entirety.42
IV.

ANALYSIS
A. Introduction

The Court has established that it possesses the discretion to tailor an
equitable judgment to reflect the circumstances of a case.43 While the Court
has discretion and flexibility as a court of equity, the responsibility of
36. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2089.
37. Id. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009)).
38. Id. at 2090 (citing Nken, 556 U. S. at 435).
39. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2090.
40. Id.
41. Id. Justice Thomas remarked that a court’s role is to “provide relief only to claimants . . . who
have suffered or will imminently suffer, actual harm.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
42. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2090.
43. Id. at 2087.
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forming an equitable remedy like a stay must still be guided by “sound legal
principles.”44 Primarily, those legal principles must be followed because
preliminary injunctions and stays are extraordinary forms of relief.45 The
stay issued in IRAP is a shining example of a stay that was tailored by the
Court based on the circumstances surrounding the two cases at bar. While
the Court flexed its discretion to create a distinction between two groups of
persons, however, it failed to adequately follow the legal principles and test
articulated in Nken v. Holder, hereinafter referred to as Nken.46
This analysis examines the Court’s misapplication of the Nken test
while offering an analysis in support of the dissenting opinion and
addressing potential issues that may occur when future courts consider
preliminary injunctions and stays. From the outset, the Court failed to
completely apply the first factor of the Nken test, which charges the Court to
evaluate whether the Government has made a strong showing that it is likely
to succeed on the merits. Next, the Court inadequately balanced the equities
by heavily tipping the scales toward the harms suffered by the respondents
and ignored the importance of the president’s power to issue such an order
and paramount interests of national security. Finally, because the Court was
not guided by the sound legal principles it created, the equitable judgment
may have lasting consequences. Accordingly, the dissenting opinion should
have instead been the unanimous decision of the Court.
B. Discussion
i. The Court’s Historical Analysis in Granting a Stay
In IRAP, the Court emphasized that it had the discretion to mold an
equitable judgment to fit the circumstances of a case, including affording
only partial relief to a stay applicant.47 However, as Justice Thomas noted,
the Court must follow certain legal guidelines when tailoring its decision.48
The Court previously outlined its test for determining whether to grant a
stay in Nken.49 According to the Court, an application for a stay may be
issued so long as a court has considered:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (citing Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)).
Id. at 437 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 434.
IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2087.
Id. at 2089.
Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
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will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.50
Of these four factors, the first two are the most important because a court
cannot rely solely on minor possibilities of success or irreparable injury.51
Instead, there must be a significant showing of the likelihood of success on
the case’s merits, as well as a significant possibility of irreparable harm.52
Further, as Justice Scalia has noted, when a court considers the likelihood of
success, “[t]here must be a reasonable probability that certiorari will be
granted . . . [and] a significant possibility that the judgment below will be
reversed.”53 Therefore, the Court may craft an equitable judgment by
emphasizing whether the claim will succeed on its merits, which is then
followed by the balancing of relative harms to parties and the consideration
of public interest.
ii. The Court Failed to Apply the “Likely to Succeed” Standard
The Court tailored its per curiam decision in IRAP to reflect the relative
harms to both parties and the public at large.54 The Court cited the
immediate harms that would come to the respondents if the injunctions were
stayed, along with the harms suffered by those in similar circumstances.55
The Court, however, held that balance tipped in favor of the Government
when an individual or entity seeking entry did not have a “bona fide”
relationship with the United States.56 Thus, the Court adequately applied at
least part of the Nken test. Surprisingly, though, the Court failed to address
the first factor of the Nken test, which Justice Thomas referenced as one of
the most critical of the four.57 In deciding to grant a stay, the Court must
consider “whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that it is
likely to succeed on the merits,” which is shown by whether certiorari may
be granted along with the possibility that the appellate courts’ decisions will
be reversed.58
In this case, according to Justice Thomas, the Government did both.59
Addressed in its Reply Brief, the Government posited that the case
warranted review because the lower courts’ decision nullified a national50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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Id. at 434-35.
Id.
Barnes v. E-Systems, 501 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers).
IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088.
Id. at 2087
Id. at 2088.
Id. at 2089.
Nken, 556 U.S. at 434; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 1302.
IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2090.
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security directive from the president.60 From a policy position, this position
has some merit because the nullification of an executive order has, among
other things, overtones of separation of powers. Furthermore, the Fourth
and Ninth Circuits raised issues with EO-2, determining that the
respondents made a sufficient showing based on violations of the
Establishment Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act.61 These
lower court decisions should warrant judicial review because they concern
both historical and modern, topical issues with the Executive Branch of
government and the powers afforded to it. Accordingly, certiorari should be
granted to the Government and, as Justice Thomas noted, it was and, at the
time of the decision, the merits of the case were to be argued before the
Court.62 However, the Court dismissed the case as moot prior to it being
heard on its merits because the period dictated in EO-2 had run its course.63
The Government also argued that there is a fair prospect that the Court
would reverse the lower court’s judgment.64 The chance of success on the
merits must be “better than negligible,” suggesting more than a mere
possibility of relief is required to exemplify a possible reversal.65 Justice
Thomas emphasized that the Government met this standard.66 Additionally,
the Government noted that the respondents did not dispute the lack of rights
afforded to aliens and that the denial of entry of those aliens is generally not
subject to judicial review.67 Further, the Government noted that there is no
“final agency action” for review under the Administrative Procedure Act
which would also suggest that EO-2 is not subject to judicial review.68
In Haig v. Agee,69 the Court held: “[m]atters intimately related to
foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial
intervention.”70 The purpose of EO-2 is the assessment of foreign policy
and national security, suggesting that the Government will succeed on its
merits because of this precedent. Finally, the Government provided a strong
argument emphasizing that the respondents’ Establishment Clause claims
were meritless because “individuals indirectly injured by alleged religious
60. Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, Trump v. Hawaii, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), (No. 161436, No. 16-1540, No. 16A1191), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2506 at *3.
61. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2086.
62. Id. at 2090.
63. Miscellaneous Order, 583 U.S. ____ (2017).
64. Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, Trump v. Hawaii, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), (No. 161436, No. 16-1540, No. 16A1191), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2506 at *8-9.
65. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (citing Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703,707 (7th Cir. 1999)).
66. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2090.
67. Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, Trump v. Hawaii, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), (No. 161436, No. 16-1540, No. 16A1191), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2506 at *8.
68. Id. at *9
69. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
70. Id. at 292.
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discrimination against others generally may not sue,” which also suggests
an increased likelihood of success for the Government.71 Therefore, the
Government arguably satisfied the first requirement of the Nken test by
providing strong arguments that would suggest that the Government would
likely succeed on its merits and the lower courts’ decisions would
subsequently be reversed.
In its per curiam decision, the Court granted the Government the stay on
the injunction in part but failed to acknowledge the “likely to succeed”
factor in its stay analysis.72 The Court likely ignored this critical factor
because the decision itself was a political one.73 Josh Blackman, a
constitutional law professor at South Texas College of Law, opined that the
per curiam decision was a compromise, with the Court purposefully not
addressing the first factor which “avoided the need of any member of the
liberal block to record a dissent, but still gave the president more or less
what he wanted.”74 This opinion is further supported by arguments made by
those in support of the stay, which suggest that courts should not question
executive orders pertaining to immigration, as the power to make policies
and rules for the exclusion of aliens has been delegated by Congress to the
Executive.75 Additionally, it has been argued that the lower courts’
preliminary injunctions undermine the president’s statutory authority to
suspend entry to any and all aliens that may be detrimental to the interests
of the United States.76 This all suggests that, given the current political
climate, the Court has tailored its decision not only to reflect the balance of
equities, but also to fit personal political opinions.
iii. The Court Failed to Correctly Balance the Equities
Once the Court has established that a stay applicant is likely to succeed
on its merits, it may then balance the equities and tailor a decision that
reflects the circumstances of the case within its discretion.77 The balance of
equities in individual circumstances is determined by evaluating the relative
harms to the parties, as well as considering the public’s interest.78 In IRAP,
71. Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, Trump v. Hawaii, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), (No. 161436, No. 16-1540, No. 16A1191), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2506 at *21.
72. Id. at 2087.
73. Josh Blackman, Symposium: Understanding the Supreme Court’s Equitable Ruling in Trump
v. IRAP, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 12, 2017, 10:40 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposiumunderstanding-supreme-courts-equitable-ruling-trump-v-irap.
74. Id.
75. Brief for American Center for Law and Justice et. al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Trump v. Hawaii, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (No. 16-1436), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2125 at *8-9
(citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)).
76. Id. at *7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012)).
77. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2087.
78. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2019

9

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 44 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 7

140

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

the Court balanced the equities and issued a decision that stayed the
injunctions in part, while keeping them in place for others.79 The Court
emphasized that if the injunctions on § 2(c) suspension of entry were stayed,
the respondents and any parties with a bona fide relationship to the United
States would be immediately harmed because they could not physically
enter the United States; thus, the Government’s interest in temporarily
suspending their entry was outweighed by that harm.80 The circumstances
surrounding IRAP, however, suggest that the Court should have tailored
their decision to stay the injunction in its entirety. The Court failed to
adequately consider the Government’s interests in the temporary restraint on
entry, as well as the overall public interest of the stay. Thus, Justice
Thomas’s dissenting opinion, which adequately balanced the equities to
hold for staying the injunctions in their entirety, should be the controlling
opinion.
Notably, the scales were not tipped in the favor of the Government’s
overarching interests in asserting its executive power afforded to it by
Congress. In Mandel, the Court held that the power to exclude aliens is “a
power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of
government.”81 The Court established that the executive branch is given
congressional authority to deny entry and, as such, when the Executive has
a legitimate reason for that exclusion, courts should not look behind the
exercise of that discretion.82 The Executive should rarely be challenged on
executive orders pertaining to immigration because it is necessary for
defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers.83 The
Court has further stated: “[p]rotection of the foreign policy of the United
States is a governmental interest of great importance, since foreign policy
and national security considerations cannot neatly be compartmentalized.”84
The Court’s reasoning in IRAP suggests that the nation’s security and
immigration policy, in respect to the temporary suspension of entry, should
be compartmentalized against the immediate harms suffered by the
respondents. For instance, the Court ignored the Government’s interest by
failing to address the power and scrutiny afforded to the president in these
matters.
As emphasized by the Government, the “[p]resident, in
consultation with Cabinet officials, determined that a temporary pause was
necessary to protect national security while he assessed” the information

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088.
Id.
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 765.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 765.
Haig, 453 U.S. at 307.
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provided by governments regarding their foreign nationals.85 In opposition,
the state of Hawaii, as a respondent, argued that the harms were real and
immediate to the respondents, as opposed to the Government’s “abstract”
harms; for example, students from the designated nations that were admitted
to the University of Hawaii, as well as Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law, were
prevented from entering the United States.86
The Court weighed these arguments and others to fashion its decision in
IRAP.87 As previously stated, though, the Court failed to adequately weigh
the interests and irreparable harms to both parties. The respondents’ side of
the scale, to which the Court tipped its favor, consisted of a few parties that
were immediately harmed by the inability to enter the United States for a
ninety-day period.88 The Government’s side of the scale, to which the Court
gave preference only under certain circumstances, consisted of an executive
order that addressed immigration and national security and was drafted by
the president and his cabinet—including high-ranking national security
officers—under powers afforded to him by Congress.89 As previously
stated, the Executive should rarely be challenged on executive orders
pertaining to immigration because it is necessary for the defense of the
country against foreign encroachments and dangers.90
Further, the
Government’s objective was only to temporarily deny entry to foreign
nationals from six countries while programs could be evaluated; the
suspension was necessary for a thorough and uninterrupted evaluation to
occur.91 Accordingly, this (im)balance of equities resulted in a decision that
should not have been made. Instead, the Court should have aligned with
Justice Thomas’s dissent and stayed the injunctions in their entirety.
The Court held that it is also important to consider the interests of the
public when issuing a stay.92 The Court clarified that “preserving national
security is ‘an urgent objective of the highest order’” in the interest of the
public.93 Justice Thomas agreed, emphasizing that a failure to stay the
injunctions in their entirety would cause irreparable harm by “‘interfering
with [the Government’s] compelling need to provide for the Nation’s
security.’”94 Nevertheless, the Court did not sufficiently balance the
85. Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, Trump v. Hawaii, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), (No. 161436, No. 16-1540, No. 16A-1191), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2506 at *23-24.
86. Supplemental Brief for Appellee-Respondent, Trump v. Hawaii, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), (No.
16-1436, No. 16-1540, No. 16A-1191), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2505 at *51.
87. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
88. Id. at 2087.
89. Id. at 2088.
90. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 765.
91. EO-2 § 2(c).
92. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2087.
93. Id. at 2088 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010)).
94. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2090.
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equities to account for the public’s interest in national security. The Court’s
opinion, instead, provided a balance that tipped the scales in favor of any
person or entity that has a bona fide relationship with the United States,
affording immediate relief not only to the respondents, but any person or
entity capable of meeting the Court’s standard.95 This equitable relief,
provided to unknown persons and entities, is not in the public’s best
interests. Public interest in national security should be given precedent over
specific individuals that would only suffer temporary harm while the
government evaluates policies and programs.
In Nken, the Court emphasized: “[t]here is always a public interest in
prompt execution of removal orders[.]”96 While Nken dealt with the power
of the Executive to deport an illegal alien,97 this reasoning may be
extrapolated to the issues addressed in IRAP. Like the continued presence
of an illegal alien in Nken, the entry of a foreign national following an
executive order that has temporarily suspended entry undermines United
States law.98 More importantly, the objective is protecting United States
citizens from terrorist attacks and the countries identified in EO-2 have been
selected because they have produced heightened concerns of terrorism.99
Arguably, these circumstances heighten the public interest in staying the
injunctions.100 Therefore, the Court erred in balancing the equities by
failing to address the importance of the public’s interest in the preservation
of national security.
Similar to its application of the “likely to succeed standard,” the Court’s
balancing act was likely a political decision, resulting from its initial
implicit refusal to address the first factor of the Nken test.101 The Court’s
emphasis on its discretion to tailor an equitable judgment may suggest a
compromise required by the Justices to reach a decision that would provide
some semblance of order until the issue could be decided on its merits.102
The off-balancing of the equities between the Government’s interest in
national security, which has historically taken precedent in the Court, and
the immediate harms to the respondents provide some support to that
conclusion.
Ultimately, this will likely only result in negative
consequences, as the Court should not engage in tailoring decisions to calm
choppy political waters. Instead of issuing a holding to maintain the status
quo until the question could be decided on its merits, the Court’s decision in
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 2088.
Nken, 556 U.S. at 436.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 436.
EO-2 § 1(a)-(b).
Nken, 556 U.S. at 436.
Blackman, supra note 73.
Id.
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IRAP complicates the balancing of equities by manipulating law and
precedent to fashion a remedy pleasing both sides of the aisle. Accordingly,
the Court’s per curiam opinion in IRAP should have aligned with Justice
Thomas’s dissent, which called for the stay in its entirety.103
iv. Possible Consequences to the Court’s Equitable Judgment
The Court’s per curiam decision may have several possible
consequences. First, as previously discussed, the Court’s decision may have
been a political one,104 which could set a precedent for this Court, as well as
lower courts, to allow the political and cultural zeitgeist to influence
landmark decisions. For instance, Judge Kozinski noted in his dissent from
a denial of stay in Washington v. Trump105 that “[e]ven if a politician’s past
statements were utterly clear and consistent, using them to yield a specific
constitutional violation would suggest an absurd result[.]”106 Also, as noted
by Lee Rudofsky, the Solicitor General of Arkansas, the injunctions that
were left in place for individuals in situations similar to the respondents
creates an issue of scope.107 According to Rudofsky, the “scope of an
injunction must be no broader than necessary to provide temporary relief to
the specific plaintiffs in a case.”108 This decision could set the precedent for
courts to award relief to an unknown class, which presents “a significant
risk of confusion in the lower courts” because the individual must fit the
class for relief, but the class here is undefined.109 More importantly, the
Court’s decision in IRAP may create repercussions when lower courts
review presidential powers and national security interests. As explained
above, the Court has given broad discretion to the Executive when
addressing immigration and national security.110 Anything other than that
discretion results in increased litigation and judicial review of important,
even imperative, executive decisions.
The dispute, which was to be decided on its merits by the Court, was
dismissed as moot on October 10, 2017, the Court reasoning § 2(c) had
“expired by its own terms.”111 President Trump, however, had already
issued a Proclamation on September 24, 2017 following the completion of
103. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2089.
104. Blackman, supra note 73.
105. 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir 2017).
106. Id. at 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
107. Lee Rudofsky, Symposium: The Stays – a Practical Victory, a Legal Concern, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jul. 14, 2017, 6:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-stays-practical-victory-legalconcern/.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.
111. Miscellaneous Order, 583 U.S. ____ (2017).
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the immigration assessment as instructed by EO-2.112 The president
detailed the national security risk indicators, such as terrorist safe-havens
and participation in the Visa Waiver Program, and declared that, after the
evaluation of these factors and more, there would henceforth be restrictions
on entry of nationals from: “Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria,
Venezuela, and Yemen.”113
Various parties subsequently sued for
preliminary injunctions of the order.114 In both instances, the U.S. District
Courts for the Districts of Maryland and Hawaii held that the plaintiffs were
likely to succeed on claims that the Proclamation violated provisions of the
INA and the equities were balanced in their favor.115 The injunction, similar
to that imposed on EO-2 originally, was nationwide.116
While the analysis performed by the district courts was proper, these
decisions should have never been issued in the first place. Not only should
the president be afforded some discretion in immigration policy, but the
Court should have stayed the original injunctions, which would have
prevented this unnecessary expense to the courts by simply delaying the
dispute until it could be decided on its merits. Unsurprisingly, the
Government has appealed and the circuit court of appeals will likely address
the same issues addressed only months before.117 Ultimately, this issue will
make its way to the Supreme Court again. When that happens, however, it is
not unrealistic to predict that any assessment of a preliminary injunction or
its stay will not be treated as the extraordinary remedy that previous Justices
had intended it to be.
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court’s decision to tailor its equitable judgment and
grant a stay of the injunctions in part while leaving the injunction in place in
respect to the respondents and those similarly situated was an error in
judgment on the Court’s behalf. In its place, the Court should have issued
Justice Thomas’s dissent as its per curiam decision and stayed the
112. Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting
Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, 2017 WL 4231190,
*1 (Sept. 24, 2017).
113. Id. at *3-4
114. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. TDC-17-0361, 2017 WL 4674314, at *2 (D.
Md. Oct. 17, 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 107 WL 4639560, at *3 (D. Haw.,
October 17, 2017).
115. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. TDC-17-0361, 2017 WL 4674314, at *41; Hawaii, No.
17-00050 DKW-KSC, 107 WL 4639560, at *1.
116. See Hawaii, 2017 WL 4639560 at *14.
117. Matt Zapotosky, Justice Department Files Notice of Appeal to Judge’s Block of Trump’s
Travel Ban, THE WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/justice-department-files-notice-of-appeal-to-judges-block-of-travel-ban/2017/10/20/29586214b50a-11e7-9e58e6288544af98_story.html?utm_term=.b9df9c98742b.
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injunctions in their entirety. The Court erred in sufficiently applying the
Nken test by ignoring the “likely-to-succeed” factor and, more importantly,
inadequately balancing the equities by failing to consider the overarching
governmental and public interests in executive discretion and national
security. Because of this likely political decision, the Court may have
avoided sparking controversy but it does not come without consequence.
Ultimately, the short decision in IRAP will have lasting effects on courts
considering preliminary injunctions and applications to stay.
JEREMY MARTIN
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